United States Supreme Court 1952
In the case of Zorach v Clauson, Justice William O. Douglas delivered the courtīs decision, stating:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every respect there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly
.
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamation making Thanksgiving a holiday; so help me Godī in our courtroom oaths-these and other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies, would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: God save the United States and this Honorable Court.
We are a religious people and our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.
We find no constitutional requirement makes it necessary for governments to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against the efforts to widen the scope of religious influence. The government must remain neutral when it comes to competition between sects. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion.
United States Supreme Court 1969
In the case of Tinker v Des Moines Independent School District stated:
It can hardly be argued that either students or teaches shed their constitutional rights to freedom or speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. Studentīs rights apply in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on campus during authorized hours.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
United States Supreme Court 1973
In the case of Anderson v Salt Lake City Corp. stated:
But this creed does not include any element of coercion concerning these beliefs unless on considers it coercive to look upon the Ten Commandments. Although they are in plain view, no one is required to read or recite them. It does not seem reasonable to require removal of a passive monument, involving no compulsion, because its accepted precepts, as a foundation for law, reflect the religious nature of an ancient era.
United State Supreme Court 1980
In the case of Stone v Graham stated:
Religion has been closely identified with our history and government, Abington School District, 1963, and that the history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. Engle v Vitale, 1962
The Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.
United States Supreme Court 1981
In the case of Widmar v Vincent, stated:
Religious worship and discussion
are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment.
Unites States Supreme Court 1983
In the case of the United States v Grace, stated:
Streets, sidewalks, and parks are considered, without more, to be public forums.
United States Supreme Court 1985
In the case of Lynch v Donnelly, Chief Justice Warren Burger rendered the courtīs opinion upholding that the city of Pawtucket, R.I. did not violate the Constitution by displaying a Nativity scene. The decision that presidential orders and proclamations from Congress have designated Christmas as a national holiday in religious terms since 1789.
The city of Pawtucket, R.I. annually erects a Christmas display in a park. The nativity display is sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday recognized by Congress and national tradition and to depict the origins of that Holiday; these are legitimate secular purposes. The Nativity is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the congressional and executive recognition of the origin of Christmas.
It would be ironic if the Nativity in the display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so taintī the exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment of Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol
would be an overreaction contrary to this Nationīs history.
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgement of all three branches of the government of the role of religion in American life. The Constitution does not require a complete separation of church and state. It affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions and forbids hostility towards any.
United States Supreme Court 1986
In the case of Bowers v Hardwick, Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the courtīs censuring of the act of sodomy:
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but five of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy
providing criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.